INTRODUCTION
Since the mid-1990s, a new vocabulary of the "social" has crept into national and transnational policy discourses: social cohesion, social capital, social inclusion/social exclusion, social economy. The relationship of this new vocabulary to the neoliberal policy prescriptions circulating in elite discourses in the 1980s and early 1990s nevertheless remains to be explained. Does it mark a break with the project of neoliberalization put forward by the American state and capital and taken up by national elites across the West and in many parts of the South, or simply a new conjuncture within that project?
Take, for instance, the interest of this paper, namely the deployment of social economy or third sector politics. These can be seen as a means of contesting neoliberal restructuring, and of proposing an alternative transcending both the democratic limits of the bureaucratized welfare state and the inequalities of market-driven social provision (Laville 1994; Lévesque and Mendell 1999) . This position nevertheless underplays the extent to which the social economy has also been absorbed into transnational policy discourses, particularly in European Union and OECD prescriptions concerning "social enterprises" (e.g. European Commission 1998; OECD 1999 OECD , 2003 , focussing more narrowly on mopping up the damage of market deregulation (Krzelso 2001, 85) . The social economy as a policy prescription thus stands between being a challenge to the American model, and acting as a "flanking mechanism" (Jessop 2002) as new institutions and governmentalities are rolled out to consolidate neoliberalism (Tickell and Peck 2003; Larner 2000) . This paper is a preliminary attempt at pushing these analyses further through the examination of social economy policies in Québec, Canada. It starts by locating its understanding of the American policy model, and then by sketching out how the new "social" policy ideas circulating in national and transnational policy discourses might or might not fit with that model. It emphasizes how these new policy ideas are disputed and how they could be related to the American model in various manners. In addition, different political actors might well adopt different transnational policy influences in attempting to shape domestic policies. This indeed appears to be the case in Québec, where three different versions of the social economy figure in policy debates, ranging from one that seeks to break with neoliberalization, to one that seeks to flank it, to a third that seeks to roll-out market relations. While the scope of empirical examination is too 
NEOLIBERALIZATION AND THE AMERICAN MODEL
The term "American Model" in social policy is open to many different interpretations. In the development of international typologies, the United States often stands as an outlier among the developed countries. While it may be grouped in with other "liberal" welfare régimes of the Anglo-American world (for instance, in EspingAndersen's "three worlds" typology), it nevertheless stands out in the extent to which social policy is delivered through a "hidden" welfare state of tax expenditures, incentives and regulations promoting private welfare provision (Hacker 2002, 12-20; Howard 1997 ).
The relative emphasis on market rather than state delivery also influences the place and role of the non-profit or voluntary sector. While intricate and tangled state-non-profit sector relations have developed in most European countries, as governments fund the sector to provide personal services, the American non-profit sector stands out in its adoption of commercial activities and strategies and for its reliance on developing relationships with businesses and private donors (including foundations) (Young 2003 ).
Yet this is not quite what is being referenced when the policy prescriptions of international organizations, such as those grouped under the label "Washington Consensus," are referred to as the "American model." Here, the term "model" is perhaps better understood as a standard to be emulated (as in the expression "model student") rather than as a description of an idiosyncratic manner of organizing social provision. In fact, the term may refer less to the actual policies pursued in the contemporary United States than to the policies and standards that the United States is championing in international forums. Thus, rather than pushing policies that will make other countries' welfare regimes resemble their own, the United States and international organizations, to say nothing of the capitalist classes in most countries, may instead be pushing a looser process of neoliberalization. The United States was not the first or only country to adopt a neoliberal form of restructuring, but it's adoption of this form had a particularly strong impact. This came from the ability of American capital to penetrate other national social formations in the post-war period, and to align the projects of other national bourgeoisie's with its own through a dense network of foreign direct investment and security ties. As neoliberalism promised, and to some degree delivered a universal model for restoring profitability and a means of integrating global capitalism through a deepening of market relations, capitalist classes elsewhere were pushed to reconfigure their domestic political economies so as to contribute to managing the emergent international order. This applied both to the adoption of American financial and management practices within firms, and to lobbying for neoliberal adjustments to public policies (Panitch and Gindin 2003; . The push for neoliberalization was facilitated by trends in the global political economy: a deflationary macroeconomic environment, the liberalization of trade and investment, and the pursuit of trade-led growth generated pressures for austerity and retrenchment that all varieties of welfare capitalism have had to accommodate in their own way (Albo and Fast 2003; Coates 2000, 251-60; Ferrera et al. 2001, 166-69) . In this sense, following the American model was one of adjusting to neoliberalism as a new form of social rule -of adopting a process of neoliberalization -and not one of simply mimicking the American welfare regime.
The use of a term designating a process (neoliberalization) over a term designating an ideology (neoliberalism) is in turn deliberate. First, it reminds us that the policy prescriptions of international organizations are not pushing towards a form of libertarian utopia, but instead seek to develop new institutions and governmentalities that deepen and sustain market relations (Tickell and Peck 2003) . This is turn means that policies need to be evaluated in terms of their contribution to constructing neoliberalism as a form of social rule, rather than solely in terms of their alignment with Hayekian philosophy or free market mantras. America serves as a model in its pursuit of this mode of restructuring, but it serves simply as one case of neoliberalization, alongside other "institutionally mediated and geopolitically specific hybrids" (Peck 2004, 393, 395) . Just as "fordism" was hybridized in the post Second World War period, so neoliberal state forms are adopted in an uneven fashion. While neoliberalism has made important strides in the Anglo-American countries and in many countries of Eastern Europe and the Global South, the European welfare states have largely limited neoliberalization to policy adjustments at the edges of their welfare states (Jessop 2002, 458) .
Analyzing a process rather than comparing policies against an ideal type allows for greater nuance in determining the fit of individual policies with the model. For instance, the shift in international policy discourse from the economic orthodoxy of the Washington consensus through the rediscovery of institutions, transparency, governance and state-building (Naim 2000) need not refer either to the jettisoning of neoliberalism, or of the American model. Fukuyama's (2004) recent volume on state-building is eloquent on the necessity of building state capacity both for the progress of economic liberalization, and for the interests of the American imperial project (which he more or less names as such).
THE DECLINE OF THE AMERICAN MODEL?
This formulation enables us to being assessing the extent to which some more recent breaks or transformations in the neoliberal project reflect challenges to or realignments in the American model. Craig Murphy (1999) with neoliberalism in terms of using public policy to enforce participation in a deregulated labour market, the emphasis on investing in human and social capital, particularly through fostering early childhood development, introduces ideas and debates absent from the neoliberal paradigm (e.g. Jenson and Saint Martin 2003) . Buckler and Dolowitz (2004) come to similar conclusions in emphasizing the importance that New Labour has given to endogenous growth theory, rather than neoliberalism, as the basis of economic policy. Yet, given the recognition of important continuities with the preceding period, particularly in terms of labour markets, it is an open question whether these departures represent an emergent state form, or adaptations of neoliberalism to remedy some of its dysfunctions, such as its tendency to consume extra-economic factors of production (e.g. trust, social cohesion) faster than it reproduced them (Jessop 2000) .
In the abstract, one can think of at least three different ways that these new policy directions might fit (or not) with the neoliberalization process. The first is suggested by Peck and Tickell (2002) with the concept of "roll-out neoliberalism" (see also Torfing 1999, 371) . In this case, an earlier period of rolling back the state has been superseded by a period of developing new institutions and governmentalities for deepening market relations and for extending market metrics to new realms of social life (cf. Larner 2000; Baines 2004; Harmes 2001; Rose 1999, 481, 483) . A second possibility comes from Jessop's (2002) labelling of recent British policies as "neoliberalism with a third way flanking." While this is not a particularly felicitous descriptor, it does provide the idea of public policies acting as "flanking mechanisms," shoring up a neoliberal policy paradigm by addressing its dysfunctions with non-market policy solutions. This is broadly similar to the social investment state arguments addressed above, except that it emphasizes the fundamental continuities in accumulation strategies over discontinuities in social policy approaches. A third possibility is that of the development of countervailing strategies that attempt to undo the neoliberalization process. This need not entail attempts to turn back the clock to the post-war welfare state, but could also involve new attempts to democratize the state and policy through meaningful channels of popular participation and control, to re-regulate labour markets, or to transform the value assigned to different forms of paid and unpaid work and care (Gindin 1998; Amin et al. 2002, 125) .
All of this is to pose the question at a high level of theoretical abstraction, and anyone the least bit sceptical of this intellectual project would heartily agree with Peck's (2004, 396) admission that "there is a growing need to add content to these assertions."
While the formulations laid out above differ from Peck's in some regards, this paper takes up his call to "track actual patterns and practices of neoliberal restructuring, and to make meaningful part-whole connections between localized and institutionally specific instances of reform and the wider discourses and ideologies of neoliberalism" (2004, 396) . There is a need to consider how the new generic policy proposals being floated in transnational policy discourse, such as social capital, social cohesion and the social economy are being translated in specific polities, and how these policies serve to roll-out, flank or countervail neoliberalism. This is a direction that the policy transfer literature is beginning to embrace, as it moves beyond the model of country-to-country bilateral policy transfers to consider the role of global policy advocates such as international organizations and non-state networks (Stone 2004, 549) . The policy transfer literature has nevertheless rightly been criticized for not adequately demonstrating how policy transfer differs from traditional policymaking processes and thus for downplaying the role of domestic institutions and policy legacies (Lodge 2003) . Indeed, I would argue that it is unlikely that it will greatly succeed in ever doing so, since, as Kingdon (1984) argued two decades ago, it is next to impossible to track down the source of an idea. On the other hand, international organizations and networks do play important roles in diffusing ideas, and in developing elite consensuses on the issues of the day and on future challenges (Carroll and Carson 2003; McBride and Williams 2001, 283, 287, 289) . In generating and spreading ideas, best practices and generic policy packages, they provide resources for political and economic transformation (Carroll and Shaw 2001, 196) . One manner of balancing the transnational with the national is to consider the policy ideas circulating in international organizations and transnational networks as resources that different domestic social actors can draw on for expertise or legitimacy in the course of contests for power within their polity. This approach likewise makes it easier to assess how different social actors may seek (or not) to draw on different bodies of transnational expertise or networks. It allows for an analysis that integrates a richer consideration of power and social relations.
This can partially correct the tendency of policy transfer work to base itself in pluralism (Dolowitz and Marsh 1996, 355) 1 and to ignore the power dynamics involved when policy is disembedded from contexts ( Peck and Theodore, 2001; Stubbs 2002, 324) .
This paper provides a preliminary attempt at assessing the content of new policy departures by looking at the development of one set of policies in one jurisdiction. More particularly, it considers policies relating to the social economy (l'économie sociale) in Québec, Canada. The choice of this focus comes from my familiarity with social economy policies and Québec politics from previous research. Nevertheless, the choice can also be justified on more scientific grounds. The social economy 2 has come to the fore, along with other policies related to civil society, social capital, and social inclusion, as a solution to particular problems of unemployment and poverty in the mid-to-late 1990s (Taylor 2003; Amin et al. 2002; Hudson 2002; Lovering 1998) . It has been taken up by the OECD in a series of publications (1996, 1999, 2003) , and has also been a subject of experimentation and evaluation by the European Commission (1998, 2003) .
Social economy strategies have also been widely adopted by European states as a primary means of responding to demands for new personal care services (Ranci 2002, 30-31) . As such, it could accurately be described as a site for policy innovation. Meanwhile, Québec provides an interesting laboratory for assessing how this new policy package has "played" in rolling-out, flanking or countervailing the neoliberalization process. Heavily 
QUÉBEC'S THREE SOCIAL ECONOMIES

The Women's Movement's Social Infrastructures
The term social economy entered into common use as a result of women's movement activism on questions of poverty and violence in the mid-1990s. Of course, service provision by non-profits had a long tradition in Québec, but the various sectoral arrangements between the state and the third sector in the health, welfare and popular education fields were not united conceptually as dealing with a singular social economy that is more than the sum of its parts.
This idea developed over a long period of reflection and struggle over means of gaining recognition from the state for women's services, without sacrificing autonomy and the capacity for advocacy and education. This theme, shared with many associations involved in autonomous community action, came to the fore in the hearings and reflections of a high-profile commission on the province's health and social services system in the mid-1980s. The province's adoption of a workfare flavoured social assistance reform in the late 1980s,in turn, highlighted the employment potential of public funding, as community organizations grew (or at least stabilized themselves) through the use of state-subsidized placements. These placements were always controversial given the recognition that the social recipients filling them were in a lowpaid, unprotected labour market, and were likely to return to social assistance at the end of their term (White 1997; Bohémier 1992 ). Yet they pointed to significant latent capacity in women's and community organizations that could be realized through increased state subsidy. At the same time, there was a growing realization that women's organizations were important local economic actors as employers, trainers, microenterprise incubators, and generators of economic activities and welfare (D'Amours 1993). This provided the basis for a broader range of claims-making by emphasizing how women's organizations had to be integrated as economic stakeholders as well as social ones.
These reflections came to a head in the mid-1990s, as the women's movement developed a platform of demands around its 1995 Bread and Roses March against violence and poverty. The March made nine demands, the first of which was for a programme of social infrastructures to consolidate and expand employment in the public and private sectors devoted to meeting human needs and creating a "social economy" of quality of human relations. This programme was modelled on traditional recessionfighting public works programmes, with the twist that it would favour female-dominated sectors and respond more directly to issues of valuing care work and balancing domestic and non-domestic work. It also demanded that funds already devoted to placing social assistance recipients be turned into recurrent subsidies for permanent community jobs paying regular wages (David and Marcoux 1995, 5-6 ). This first demand was filled out by others that likewise sought to re-regulate the labour market (minimum wages raised to the poverty line; upgrading minimum labour standards; pay equity; access to training) in a manner to better recognize women's work, and to thus combat poverty.
The March made only passing reference to the social economy, but the women's movement quickly defined this as a privileged terrain for developing social infrastructures. In line with the idea of infrastructures, the women's movement demanded that any monies invested in the social economy had to create lasting, well-paid jobs in the primary labour market, and that community initiatives not be used to replace jobs in the public sector (e.g. Conseil du statut de la femme 1996; Comité d 'Orientation 1996) . This would ultimately require a dramatic and lasting increase in state expenditure in personal services, but it was variously argued that this could be accommodated by changing spending and taxation priorities (David and Marcoux 1996, 6) or that this was still cheaper than expanding direct state provision (Conseil du statut de la femmes 1996).
This vision continued to guide movement actors on the ground as they negotiated the implementation of some small social economy initiatives in local and regional This project could be considered as a countervailing strategy to the American model of neoliberalization. For instance, it centred economic activity on the idea of meeting needs rather than on profit-making. It recognized that social production reaches beyond the formal market economy to include economies of care that require greater recognition and support. To this end, it proposed to re-regulate the labour market and rebuild state capacities to redistribute wealth and create welfare. It is clearly a utopian proposition in the context of Québec's insertion in the continental economic/political/security space, requiring a very different balance of social forces to be realized. Yet it provides a concrete utopia in the sense that policies to recognize and consolidate care work, or to partially re-regulate labour markets, represent steps in a longer term process of changing Québec's political-economic trajectory.
One might ask where transnational policy ideas fit in this picture. Two relatively hidden avenues are of interest. First, the women's movement's organic intellectuals in the universities were engaged in debates in feminist economics about the embeddedness of economies and the valuation of care work (Toupin 2001, 8-17; Côté 2001; Duval and Sabourin 1999) . These ideas served to frame discussions and strategic directions, but were then re-embedded in local knowledges through popular education processes (Sabourin and Duval 2001) . 
From social infrastructures to the social economy as flanking mechanism
The radicalism of the social infrastructures model was slowly consumed in engagements with the state and other social actors. The change in terminology from social infrastructures to social economy represented a first step. To start, the use of the social economy tag allowed for the re-erection of a state/community divide, with the social economy referring to the latter part, and thus taking the light off public sector labour markets. It was now the contribution of non-profit organizations to meeting needs and creating employment that would be attract attention. The use of the term "social economy" also moved the terrain of debate in the direction of projects held by parts of the community economic development and trade union movements.
The Chantier de l'économie sociale quickly became the standard-bearer for this project, and also the state's leading interlocutor on developing the sector. In its earlier incarnation as a government working group, the Chantier broke with the women's movement's social economy. It did take up the demands that government action support lasting, well-paid jobs without displacing work from the public sector (Groupe de travail 1996, 10-12). Nevertheless, the centre of gravity moved from the idea of recurrent investment in community organizations to that of supporting the growth and development of community initiatives taking the enterprise form. This support could be justified on the strength of the social economy's contribution to creating jobs (and thus to reducing the costs related to unemployment), to re-integrating the socially excluded into the labour market (be it primary or sheltered work) and to aiding the good functioning of society.
The Chantier's report therefore called for public policies to provide appropriate financing tools, support for collective entrepreneurship, and training in order to support the development of new social economy firms (Groupe de travail 1996, 35-40) . Once founded as an autonomous organization, the Chantier did not greatly transform its programme. It continued to advance the social economy as part of a plural economy, and as particularly suited for bridging social and economic development, by developing new economic activities in order to meet emergent needs. It argued for an "économie 'avec marché'" rather than an "économie 'de marché'" (economy with market, not a market economy), with the view that once the social economy gained a large enough market share, it would alter the dominant development model (Chantier 2001, 9-11) . The means to this end were measures to increase the entrepreneurial capacity of different localities through opening access to capital, and to provide more expertise and start-up financing to social economy entrepreneurs (Chantier 2001, 20-21) .
The intellectuals supporting this project claim that it represents part of a progressive alternative to neoliberalism. It provides a means of rebuilding social provision, in contrast to continued neoliberal retrenchment. It does so through the development of community rooted participation and solidarity, and thus also avoids the taylorist bureaucracy of the post-war welfare state (Vaillancourt et al. 2002; Comeau et al., 2001; Lévesque and Mendell 1999) . While this argument has echoes of Paul Hirst's work on associative democracy, its inspirations are more continental European. Indeed, these intellectuals have been active participants in the development of transnational discourses on the social economy, contributing to European academic production (e.g. the was that the extra-economic costs and dysfunctions generated by the economic system were jeopardizing economic performance and threatening "the whole of the social contract." These negative externalities risked undermining "the heart of the system."
EMES network and its Tackling Social Exclusion in Europe
The volume's papers did not seek to advance "a complete alternative to the dominant, market-based paradigm -which has a lot of valuable qualities -but to expand it" by putting the economy back in its place, by rooting out externalities at their origin, and by intensifying the link between economy and democracy (Sauvage 1996, 10-11) . This meant developing a quaternary or "quality of life" sector bringing together market resources, public financing and non-monetary resources to buttress the non-conventional economy, and to ensure it was neither "ghettoized" as a second class sector, nor marketized at the expense of its non-monetary dimensions.
Other contributions to OECD publications and evaluations of social economy pilots for the European Commission take a similar tack. They emphasize the need to provide state supports and expertise for the development and running of said projects.
While the ultimate goal appears to bring social economy initiatives towards limited reliance on state resources, they remain attuned to the dangers of 'isomorphism' if these initiatives are merged too soon with the market economy. The very attributes that recommend such initiatives, in terms of building social cohesion, social inclusion and social capital, appear to be squeezed out as competition with private firms increases (Borzaga and Santuari 2003, 53, 55; ECOTEC 54-55, 69; European Commission 2003) .
In short, the social economy must not be developed within a neoliberal frame since this would colonize the sector and use up its social capital without replacing it (Evers 1996, 87-88) .
This position fits under the "flanking label" since it erects the social economy as a space of solidarity and action capable of mending the exclusions of neoliberalism without attempting to reconfigure dominant economic relations except in some distant future where the social economy has a dominant market share. In calling for policies to develop the expertise and capacity of social economy firms, it provides space for these firms to develop autonomously from the dictates of state and market, and to thus also play their role in developing social capital and cohesion. This position rejects the idea of heavy ongoing subsidization found in the social infrastructures view, yet also recognizes that the character of activities being undertaken (e.g. serving markets with low effective demand; employing people with 'low productivity' as conventionally defined; production of non-market externalities such as social cohesion and social capital in addition to marketable goods and services) require that state financial and technical support be made available over the medium-to-long term. In short, it embraces a vision of the social economy built around individual enterprises, but proposes policies leaving enough wiggle room to meet ends such as democratic management, quality work, and participation by users.
This position enjoyed some influence in Québec under the centre-left Parti Québécois (PQ) government (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) . The PQ integrated a social economy mandate in the new regional and local development strategy (Québec 1998a) , and engaged the 
Rolling-out the social economy
A final position in the Québec debate was rooted in the mainline state ministries, and largely centred in the province's finance ministry. It was more pre-occupied with rolling-out new institutions to neoliberalize the sector. In parts, this policy had a surface resemblance to the flanking approach. It too proposed opening new sources of financing and expertise to social economy firms, but with an eye more firmly on the goal of creating social enterprises capable of meeting new social needs in a productive and cost effective manner. While lip-service was given to possible contributions to social cohesion and social capital, little room was built into policy options for developing and reproducing these goods. Roll-out went further in some places with the creation of quasimarket mechanisms in order to steer the development of the social economy in particular spheres.
From the start, mainline government departments attempted to limit the progressive potential of social economy initiatives. When local women's organizations fought for hourly wages of $8.30 in funded projects, the government made it clear that the maximum wage for such work should be the going wage for such programmes, namely the minimum wage of $6.45 (Québec 1997) . Early efforts likewise heavily favoured projects that could become self-financing within three years, favouring initiatives serving clienteles able to pay user fees (Association feminine 1998). In the homecare field, the Ministry of Finance went further in market-making by creating a tax exemption programme whose provisions favoured the development of entrepreneurial non-profit home care firms. The levels of funding necessitated the use lean organizations paying relatively low wages (approx. $8.70 per hour for production workers) (Comeau et al. 2001) , and required the firms to be 50% self-financing within three years. More generally, the work of social economy organizations contracting with state ministries has been increasingly closely regulated by strict accountability and evaluation mechanisms, reducing the autonomy of social economy organizations and their resources for advocacy and internal democracy (René et al 2001) .
The Finance Ministry's interest in the social economy was related to its economic development strategy. It celebrated the contribution of economic liberalism to Québec's development, but also claimed to support policies that ensured that this market order also produced a humane and solidaristic economy. While this seemed to signal an embrace of flanking mechanisms, the policy prescriptions in this latter vein went little beyond increasing labour market participation through active labour market policies and higher rates of school completion. The social economy was heralded for its ability to rectify problems of social exclusion, but the Ministry's main interest was to consolidate the entrepreneurial approach by developing new non-profit firms (Québec 1998b ). These could then meet new needs, or, as in the case of Québec's mid-1990s ambulatory care reform, take up the slack for cuts in public provision (Association feminine 1998). programmes aimed at small business, and revised legal statuses to ease entrepreneurial activity (Québec 2003, 32-39) . Despite broad similarities with the policy prescriptions of the Chantier, the blueprint is motivated by a different philosophy. It shows few signs of concern over issues of possible isomorphism, or of the need to keep social economy initiatives some distance from the market in order to produce social externalities.
Instead, social economy firms are assumed to produce such externalities almost automatically, and these assumed externalities are in turn used to justify giving different state assistance to these firms as compared to small for-profit businesses.
Government documents laying out this position are not eloquent in acknowledging transnational policy influences, suggesting the need for this researcher to obtain interview data. The Department of Finance has followed the international debates to some extent, presenting the experiences of France, Italy and Belgium in an appendix to its 2003 budget paper on the social economy (Québec 2003, 51-55) . The echoes of transnational discourses emanating from the OECD and the European Commission are striking. Both bodies have stressed the development of entrepreneurial social economies, adopting small business development models to new forms of social entrepreneurship (OECD 1998, ch. 7; OECD 1999; European Commission 1998) . The relationship between the state and the social economy in this model is one of the gardener to his or her plants: the Commission calls for the application of good practices through the gardening reproduction techniques of grafting, layering and propagation (European Commission 1998, 10), while the summary of an OECD publication uses the fragrant metaphor of using project training and assistance "to help the local 'compost' to mature" (Sauvage 1996, 22) .
In less figurative terms, this involves supporting the development of non-profit firms, including the development of new financial instruments, new legal frameworks, and training initiatives. The professionalization of work in the field is an important goal, in order for social economy firms to take on a bigger service delivery role and to eventually become economically competitive with for-profit firms. More generally, the increased contracting-out of public service delivery is promoted in order to develop the sector without having major distortionary effects on market incentives (OECD 1998, 29-30; Jouen 1996, 162-65; OECD 1999, 57-58; European Commission 1998, 19, 28-29) .
As the previous section hinted, the European and OECD reflections on the social economy have wavered between the emphasis on roll-out and flanking strategies. The positions of the Québec government have likewise not invested as greatly in rolling-out new quasi-market mechanisms to regulate the social economy as in pushing a purer entrepreneurial approach than found in the flanking strategy. The development of positive social externalities like social capital is assumed to flow from the very existence of social economy firms, so the policy correlate is to adopt traditional small business development strategies to the particular situation (different legal status; lack of assets to use as collateral) of social economy firms.
Policy outcomes
In sum, then, the debate over the social economy in Québec has included at least three important visions, each with its own ties to transnational discourses, and each with its own relation to the American model of neoliberalization. As the preceding discussion illustrated, the two main poles of debate are those of the social economy as a flanking mechanism and as the roll-out of further neoliberalization. This has indeed marked the state's discourse on the social economy, and the views of the Chantier, its main interlocutor. It is reflected in a scattered set of small financing and training initiatives, delivered largely by regional and local development bodies. In the process, the encompassing vision of social infrastructures has been placed aside, and attention has An assessment of one policy in one polity (subnational at that!) clearly can make no claim to generalizability globally, let alone within the so-called developed countries or even in the liberal welfare regimes. The interest in this instance involves weighing whether newer policy packages being mooted in transnational policy discourses, such as those associated with the concepts of the social economy, social inclusion and social capital, represent a break with the earlier project of neoliberalization. The Québec experience intimates that these policy packages, while continually subject to political dispute and negotiation, offer little that goes beyond neoliberalization. The policies may introduce a new vocabulary, and even offer opportunities to push alternatives (e.g. social infrastructures), but mainly reflect a discussion of whether to deepen the neoliberalization process, or to develop mechanisms to shore up its emerging contradictions.
This intimation comes not only from the specifics of the Québec case, but also from what that case tells us about the discourses in circulation. The main debate in
Québec opposes a roll-out neoliberalism attempting to develop quasi-markets to allocate resources and efforts within a non-profit economy, and a flanking to neoliberalism more concerned with using the enterprise form to mop up unemployment and poverty. This more or less reproduces the range of elite opinion within the European Commission and the OECD, suggesting that these are likely parameters for policy development elsewhere in the so-called developed countries. Amin et al.'s conclusion (2002, 29) that the social economy is "part of a new governmentality that seeks to defuse and control proposals for radical social change rather than becoming a conduit for promoting such change" finds much comfort here. On the other hand, utopian visions of the social economy, such as put forward by Québec's women's movement, still have the capability of rooting themselves at the margins of policy development. Meanwhile, the development of rollout and flanking policies earmark budgetary resources to this sector, even as they encourage the mobilization of associations and coalitions to represent its interests (Smith 2002, 90) . It is not unthinkable that these associations might one day steer these resources towards projects that go beyond flanking the American model of neoliberalization.
